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Abstract 
The paper is an extension of the Gabillon and Martimort model (2004), which studies how the independence of 
the institution in charge of monetary policy may stabilize inflationary fluctuations due to political uncertainty 
when the economy is characterized by lobbies that seek to promote their own interests to the detriment of the 
general interests of society. This extension strengthens the hypothesis that the independence of the CB is the best 
institutional design with which to protect the general interests of „society‟. In fact, a Central Banker independent 
from the political principal that appoints it represents the best control by the minority with respect to decisions 
taken by the elected political majority. 
Keywords: monetary policy, central bank, Partisan politics 
1. Introduction 
The question of the Central Bank, its political independence, its tasks, and how it fulfils them, has returned to the 
centre of political discussion. The Anglo-American subprime crisis of 2007 and the European sovereign debt 
crisis of 2011 generated intense pressure by politicians, financial institutions, employers and trade unions for a 
further extension of the competence of Central Banks in financial supervision, and for expansion of the 
objectives and degrees of freedom in the monetary policy that Central Banks implement. 
This paper examines a case in which the Central Bank must pursue its objectives, while diverse actors, such as 
political institutions (government or parliament), financial institutions (commercial banks, investment funds, 
insurance companies) and in general all organized interest groups (lobbies) apply strong pressure on the Central 
Bank in order to „capture‟ it and ensure monetary policy decisions which do not conflict with their interests 
(Note 1). 
This is a problem common to all processes of delegation by a principal – the government, parliament or 
politicians in the broad sense – to an agent – the „authority‟ or an independent bureaucrat. 
The core question is this: what are the costs and benefits of granting independence to these regulatory 
authorities? 
A body of economic literature (Stigler, 1971; Posner 1974; Laffont & Tirole, 1993; Laffont & Martimort, 1999; 
Faure-Grimaud & Martimort, 2001) has sought to give an answer to this question by analysing the interactions 
among a regulatory agency, its political principals, and the interest group which is supposed to be regulated. 
In the case of monetary policy, the conflict of interest among economic agents, which in turn reflects their 
diversity, is essential for interpretation of these costs and benefits. 
The conflict of interest relates to the creditors/debtors issue in the economy. Inflation reduces the real weight of a 
non-indexed debt – i.e. one which remains fixed in nominal terms – while disinflation aggravates that weight. 
For debtors, inflation means lower real debt, whereas disinflation means higher debt. Thus generated is a 
symmetrical redistributive effect: inflation redistributes from creditors to debtors; disinflation does so from 
debtors to creditors. In a context of this kind, the banks and large financial groups (Note 2) are anti-inflation 
actors (Note 3). By contrast, small business owners and farmers, who have an incentive to favour „surprise 
inflation‟ in order to pay lower real wages, or all economic actors exposed to the banking sector, are pro-inflation 
groups (Note 4). 
To be noted is that interest groups (lobbies) have a particularly influential role only if they can corrupt and 
acquire particular economic information also available to the Central Banker: in this case the lobbies have an 
ijef.ccsenet.org International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 12, No. 1; 2020 
9 
interest in inducing the monetary authority to conceal important information so that they can gain an advantage. 
The institutional design of monetary policy – for example, the degree of independence of the Central Bank – 
may also influence the relationship between interest groups and the monetary authority (Cukierman, 2013). 
It can be also hypothesised that the more a Central Bank is independent of the government, the more vulnerable 
it will be to the pressure of interest groups. 
All these aspects have been analysed by Gabillon and Martimort (2004), who consider a „two-tier‟ model of 
monetary policy where the Central Banker is subject to both explicit influence by the elected political principal 
through a contract and implicit influence by anti-inflation interest groups seeking to „capture‟ monetary policy. 
The degree of political independence therefore influences the agency costs paid to control the Central Banker. 
The result obtained by Gabillon and Martimort (2004) is that political independence increases the agency costs 
(agency cost effects) but prevents greater fluctuations in inflation due to exogenous political uncertainty with 
respect to the election result (stabilization effect). On comparing the two effects, ex-ante social welfare increases 
in the case of political independence. 
This paper investigates how the independence of the Central Bank influences the election outcome when 
political uncertainty is endogenized in Gabillon and Martimort‟s model, considering forward-looking voters who 
make their decisions by comparing the policy platforms proposed by the two main political competitors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of Gabillon and Martimort‟s model; 
Section 3 describes our extension of this model; finally, Section 4 sets out the conclusions. 
2. The Gabillon-Martimort Model 
Gabillon and Martimort (2004) provide an explanation for a possible link between the degree of independence of 
a Central Bank (CB) and policy stabilization. The first key ingredient of  the model is the possibility of capture 
of these agencies by the interest groups in the financial sector. Indeed, in a world of information asymmetries, 
regulators accumulate information about the welfare effects of different policies and they can be bribed to 
manipulate information. The second ingredient is political uncertainty. The extent to which a Central Bank is 
affiliated to a political party affects the likelihood that this particular agency remains in place as political powers 
alternate in office. The status of the Central Bank thus significantly changes the collusive opportunities between 
this Central Bank and the financial industry. 
In this section, we summarize the main elements of the Gabillon-Martimort model (Note 5). This will serve the 
purposes of the next section, in which we proceed with extension of this model.  
Contrary to the literature on monetary institutions that takes the contractual approach, the CB‟s incentive 
mechanisms are not designed by a social planner, but by partisan political principals (Note 6) who want to please 
different constituencies and thus express different concerns for the trade-off between price control and surprise 
inflation depending on whether they represent a leftist or a rightist constituency (Note 7). Because of information 
asymmetry between the CB and the government, there is also scope for collusion between private interest groups 
and the CB. However, the scope for capture depends on the exact control rights that principals retain over the 
CB. 
2.1 Preferences 
CB: The CB receives a monetary transfer s from whichever political principal has been elected to perform the 
monetary policy. The CB‟s utility is V = s. 
This transfer can be viewed as the share of the central bank budget and resources that can be diverted by the 
monetary authority for its private use. Alternatively it can also be interpreted as the probability of being 
promoted to a higher position in the civil service times the benefits of this higher position.   
Political Principals: A political principal maximises an objective function à la Barro-Gordon (1983):  
 2 / 2 ei iSW s                                       (1) 
where  is the inflation level, e  its expectations, 𝛼𝑖 > 0 (with 𝑖 ∈ {𝐿, 𝑅}) is the weight that the political 
principal gives to creating surprise inflation.  is a macroeconomic shock affecting both political principals‟ 
concerns for output expansion. s is the transfer given to the CB (Note 8). 
A rightist government is less willing to create surprise inflation than a leftist one. Δα = 𝛼𝐿 − 𝛼𝑅 > 0 represents 
the degree of polarization of the society i.e. the difference between the concerns for surprise inflation between a 
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leftist party and a rightist one. The probabilities of each of these two political principals being elected are 
exogenous (α = α𝑅 with probability p and α = α𝐿 with probability 1 - p). In the next section we will change 
this assumption. 
Interest group: The anti-inflationist group obtains a utility from unexpected inflation which is equal to: 
 with β>0 (Note 9). 
2.2 Information structure 
The shock is  drawn from a common knowledge distribution on  with respective probabilities 1 - v 
and v. It is possible to normalise  so that we have . Anti-inflationist incentives are thus 
greater when   is realised. The CB and the interest group have complete information on the shock . This 
information structure has already been discussed in the literature by Peek, Rosemgren, and Tootell (1999), who 
analyze the relationship between monetary policy and problems in the banking sector, which may serve as an 
early indicator of deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. 
Instead, at the time when the CB‟s incentives are designed, the political principals and the (non-financial) private 
sector remain uninformed about the exact value of this shock. 
The CB can conceal verifiable evidence that the economy is doing badly ( ) and instead announce that . 
The mere possibility that the CB can conceal such information is the „key‟ to understanding the scope for 
collusion with an anti-inflationist interest group. Conversely, the CB can issue credible reports about the real 
state of the economy (Note 10). 
2.3 Incentive Contract 
Study of the properties of mechanisms designed to prevent collusion between several members of an 
organization has become a highly active area of research since the pioneering work of Tirole (1986). 
When, as in our case, a supervisor (CB) and an agent (Financial Sector) have complete information about an 
event (the real situation of the economy), while a principal (Political Principal) is not informed about this event, 
we can verify that agent–supervisor coalitions can be formed to maximize private objectives and potentially 
defeat the purpose for which that supervision has been established. Our analysis will now take account of the 
possibility that such collusive behaviour of the agent and the supervisor may occur. We can assume that the two 
parties agree by way of a side-contract. This side-contract will reduce the ability of the principal to extract 
information from the supervisor. To avoid such collusion, the principal can in turn reward the supervisor for 
every report on the true state of the economy. 
The optimal contract is always the contract that deters collusion. Should collusion occur, at the optimum the 
principal can always alter the contract by making quantity transfers independent of the supervisor‟s report, and 
collusion will be deterred because it is no longer useful to the agent. This is known as the collusion-proofness 
principle. 
Hence, to deter collusion, the principal must be sure to reward the supervisor for reporting the truth by an 
amount that is exactly equal to the maximum bribe that the agent can offer the supervisor to keep quiet: anything 
less will open the door to collusion, and anything more will be a waste of money. 
2.4 CB contracts and Collusion Technology 
The grand-contract between the elected political principal and the CB consists of wages s and inflation targets . 
 (resp. ) represents, respectively, the wage and inflation target when the economy is going well 
 (resp. goes badly, ). 
The side-contract or collusion between the CB and the interest group consists of secret side-transfers. The CB 
has all the bargaining power in the design of side-contracts. When the economy is going badly, the 
anti-inflationist interest groups want the CB to report  to keep inflation low. From the false report of the CB 
to the political principal, the interest group earns:  
. 
 eIG     
 ,  
1  1 0    
ˆ 
 ,i is   ,i is 
 

  ( )e eii i i i            
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The interest group is not willing to bribe the CB to misreport when   realizes, since doing so would increase 
inflation. However, because of the illegal nature of capture, the side-contract between this group and the CB 
suffers from some transaction costs (Note 11). The exchange of  units of bribes only yields the CB a private 
benefit from holding office: , where  and r >0, so that the transaction costs of 
side-contracting are equal:  - K() (Note 12). 
2.5 The Legal Status of the CB 
The CB has political independence (PI) when he cannot be fired by the newly-elected political principal. Under 
political control (PC) the CB is in power if the party with which he is affiliated is elected. In this case, the 
principal has control rights on who should be the head of the Central Bank. 
2.6 Timings  
The timing of the game depends on the legal status of the Central Bank.  
Under political control it is as follows: 
T = 0: The electoral outcome realizes, and the preferences of the elected political principal are known to all 
players including the private sector of the economy.  
T = 1: The CB receives a grand-contract from the political principal that has just been elected. This contract 
stipulates wages and inflation targets. The private sector forms its expectations on inflation and negotiates wage 
contracts.  
T = 2: Ex-post collusion stage. If the CB has accepted the grand-contract, he offers a side-contract to the interest 
group. This side-contract consists of a bribe in exchange for hiding the item of information that he has available. 
This side-contract is accepted or rejected.  
T = 3:   is learned by the CB and the interest group.  
T = 4: The CB makes an announcement on the state of the economy, and the corresponding inflation target and 
wage are implemented. Side-transfers, if any, are exchanged. 
Importantly, under political control the CB and the interest group cannot agree on a side-contract before political 
uncertainty is resolved. Instead, an independent CB and the interest group can also agree on an ex-ante 
side-contract. 
With an independent CB, the timing of the game is in part as above:  
T = 0: Both political parties propose their electoral platforms non-cooperatively. These platforms consist of 
incentive contracts to the CB. These grand-contracts stipulate budgets and inflation targets conditionally on 
whether the offering party is elected. The CB accepts or rejects both grand-contracts, being still uninformed on 
the state of the economy . 
T = 1: Ex-ante collusion stage. If the CB has accepted the grand-contracts, he offers a side-contract to the interest 
group. This side-contract is now conditional on the electoral outcome. 
T = 2: The electoral outcome realizes and the preferences of the political principal are known to all players 
including the private sector of the economy, which now forms its expectations on inflation.  
Stages T = 3 and T = 4 are then the same as with affiliated CBs.  
2.7 A Benchmark wth Complete Information 
Under complete information, the first best inflation targets,  and , offered by the elected political principal 
i maximize expected welfare defined as: 
 ii
Max
 ,
  
s.t. . 
Rewriting the principal‟s objective as a function of average inflation  and the difference in inflation targets 
 the principal‟s problem becomes: 
2( )
2
r
K k    0 1k 
i i
   
2 2
(1 )
2 2
e ei i
ii i i i iv v

     
   
          
  
(1 )e ii iv v    
e
i
i i    
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In the case of full commitment to a policy rule, the optimal monetary policy requires: 
 
The difference in inflation targets between both states of the world is thus: 
 
The above commitment policy has been extensively criticized for not being time-consistent. Gabillon and 
Martimort investigate instead how this policy is robust to political pressures. Taking this perspective highlights 
that different institutional designs offer different responses to agency problems. They find that: 
(Note 13). However, granting political independence to the CB somewhat insulates 
monetary policy from political fluctuations: a stabilization effect. The cost of independence is nevertheless that 
the CB is more prone to capture by interest groups: a delegation effect. The stabilization effect is always strong 
enough to dominate the delegation effect. Hence, ex ante social welfare is greater under political independence 
than under political control. 
3. An Extension of Gabillon-Martimort’s Model with Endogenous Political Uncertainty 
In this section, election probabilities are thus endogenized, with each party‟s probability of success depending on 
both its own and the other parties‟ policies. This approach (Note 14) considerably revises the properties of the 
classic partisan model. Most notably, we demonstrate that endogenous voting will have important consequences 
for the magnitude of the partisan effect. 
Let us now endogenize political uncertainty in Gabillon-Martimort‟s model by assuming that forward-looking 
voters decide their ballot by comparing the expected payoffs that they will obtain with each party. Voters are 
ideologically differentiated with respect to the trade-off that they would implement between surprise inflation 
and price stabilization i.e. with respect to their  (Note 15). This parameter may in this case be interpreted as 
representing the voter‟s location in the wealth distribution. 
3.1. Monetary Policy under Political Control 
Let us first consider the case when the Central Banker is under political control. Because agent  is indifferent 
between a rightist policy  and a leftist policy implementing , it must obtain the same expected payoff 
with both policies. Hence: 
 
Following Gabillon and Martimort (2004), we now write social welfare, in regime political control with party 
 RLi , , under asymmetric information and the threat of capture, thus: 
  iSW   (Note 16)         (2) 
where  is the agency cost associated with the delegation of monetary policy to the 
CB (Note 17). 
Under asymmetric information and political control, the optimal collusion-proof monetary policy offered by a 
political principal i entails no inflationary bias, so that: 
𝜋𝑖
𝑒 = 0 
We now rewrite the social welfare function as follows: 
  iSW 
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                          (3) 
0FBei 
0FBi i     
PC PI PI PC
R R L L         
R L
   R LSW SW    
 
 
 
 
2 2
1
2 2
e
i i PC
i i i iv v AC
 
   
 
        
 
 
     1PCi i iAC v K     
ijef.ccsenet.org International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 12, No. 1; 2020 
13 
The probability of the political party i (with i= Right, Left) being elected is a function of politically induced 
fluctuations in the variance of inflation, thus: . 
We take from Friedman the hypothesis of variance of inflation. Indeed, Friedman (1977) considered why policy 
makers may be affected by inflation variability. Friedman wanted to explain why there is a positive correlation 
between the level of inflation and the variability of inflation across countries and over time for any given country. 
In Friedman‟s analysis, a government may temporarily pursue a set of policy goals (output, employment) that 
lead to high inflation; this, in turn, elicits strong political pressure to reduce the debasing of the currency. 
Chowdhury (1991) re-examined the relation between the level and the variability of inflation for a sample of 
sixty-six countries over the 1955–90 period. His results indicate the presence of a significant positive relation 
between the rate of inflation and its variability. 
In a Nash equilibrium of the choice of the political right-wing party platforms,  chooses  so that it 
maximizes: 
                  (4) 
Then: 
 
𝑍𝑅 now takes into account the impact of its policy choice on the probability of being elected. The corresponding 
first-order condition (FOC) is now written as: 
                  (5) 
After some algebra we obtain: 
                  (6) 
In the case of the left, 𝑍𝐿 chooses 𝛥𝜋𝐿 so that it maximizes: 
                    (7) 
Then: 
 
The corresponding FOC is now written as: 
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(6) and (9) represent a system of nonlinear differential equations. We solve this system numerically. The results 
of the simulations are shown in figures (1) (2) (3) and (4) for different values of some parameters. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4.  
 
Direct observations show that the electoral effect is negative with the left and positive with the right (Note 18). 
Indeed, reducing (resp. increasing) the difference in inflation targets now increases the probability that the left 
(resp. right) is elected and, for this reason, the left offers a platform shifted downwards. 
3.2 Monetary Policy under Political Independence 
Under the political independence of the Central Banker, monetary policy is carried out for both political 
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principals. For this reason, the Central Banker can offer a side-contract to the anti-inflationist interest group 
before political uncertainty is resolved (Note 19). 
Therefore, with political independence, the agency cost associated with the delegation of monetary policy to the 
CB is written thus in the case of a rightist government: 
               (10) 
in the case of a leftist government: 
               (11) 
Because agent  is indifferent between a rightist policy 𝛥𝜋𝑅 and a leftist policy implementing 𝛥𝜋𝐿, it must 
obtain the same payoff with both policies. To simplify, we focus on the case where both parties pay the same 
wage to the independent Central Banker in an interior equilibrium, i.e., we posit a particular distribution of the 
gains from dealing with a common bureaucrat. 
The identity of the swing voter  is now such that: 
                  (12) 
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After some algebra we obtain: 
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(14) and (16) represent a system of nonlinear differential equations. We solve this system numerically. The 
results of the simulations are shown in figures: (5) (6) (7) and (8) for different values of some parameters. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Figure 6.  
  
Figure 7.  Figure 8.  
 
For both parties, the electoral effect still includes a term taking the same form as with a politically dependent 
Central Banker. However, there appears a new term which captures the impact of the choice of the platform on 
the agency cost of delegation to an independent Central Banker. 
More importantly, the greater sensitivity of the swing voter to inflation variations( ) under independence may 
increase the convergence of the platforms towards middle-road policies. This is clear on comparing the results of 
the system (1) (which is the institutional monetary regime under political dependence) with the results of the 
system (2) (which is the institutional monetary regime under political independence). 
  
Figure 9.  Figure 10.  

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Figure 11.  Figure 12.  
 
This would reinforce Gabillon-Martimorts‟ finding that the independent Central Banker makes policies converge 
further one towards the order. 
4. Conclusions 
The foregoing analysis has examined the interesting feedback between institutions and election results. In this 
case, the amount of political uncertainty and the choice of institutional design have been determined 
simultaneously in the model. Endogenizing political uncertainty reinforces the stabilization effect. A rightist 
(resp. leftist) policymaker increases (resp. decreases) the variance of inflation and now looks much more like a 
leftist (resp. rightist) policy maker. 
This finding strengthens the hypothesis that the independence of the CB is the best institutional design with 
which to protect the general interests of „society‟. In fact, a Central Banker independent from the political 
principal that appoints it represents the best control by the minority with respect to decisions taken by the elected 
political majority. 
This line of research could continue in various directions. The first is consideration of political systems more 
complex than a two-party one: that is, multi-party systems and coalition governments, which are generally 
associated with parliamentary political regimes. The political economics literature (Note 20) emphasises, in fact, 
that these characteristics increase political uncertainty. This suggests that the benefits of the Central Bank‟s 
political independence are greater in parliamentary systems: an aspect which should be analysed both 
theoretically and empirically. 
A second direction for further inquiry within the framework analysed is theoretical and empirical investigation of 
the possible separation of banking supervision from monetary policy. This should increase the transaction costs 
deriving from collusion between banks and monetary authorities. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Canova (2007, p. 3) discussed the non-state actors that impacted on the present global economic order by 
capturing state institutions – the regulated industry capturing the regulator – often with promises of future 
employment, political support, and campaign contributions. But he mentioned that there was a “relative silence 
regarding the capture of Central Banks, perhaps the most significant agency capture by non-state actors in 
today's de-jure international financial setup”. 
Note 2. On this see Posen (1995), who argues that the financial sector is generally the main supporter of the 
Central Bank‟s political independence. 
Note 3. Kane (1980) argues that builders and construction unions also form an anti-inflationist group for similar 
reasons. 
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Note 4. Of course, there have been moments in history – for example, the financial crisis of 2007 – when also the 
financial sector has found it convenient to ease its debts. 
Note 5. This section follows the same  notation used by Gabillon and Martimort (2004). 
Note 6. The political principal can be conceived as the elected legislative or executive branch of the government. 
Note 7. It is a contract between an elected political principal, a CB, and the private sector in a two-tier model of 
monetary policy. 
Note 8. The Central Bank has no weight in the principal‟s objective function, capturing the fact that 
redistributing wealth to bureaucrats as such is not part of the government‟s objective. Alternatively, civil servants 
represent a group with negligible social weight. The main insights of the analysis are robust to the case where 
parties‟ objective functions give the same positive (but less than one) weight to the regulator‟s utility. (See 
Laffont and Martimort, 1999; Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2003, where they show that the separation of 
powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture ). This means considering 
the objective function in this way:
 
for any  
Note 9. The pro-inflationist interest group can be easily seen in the model. In this case the utility of this group is: 
 with  > 0. 
Note 10. A „credible report‟ means that the CB presents documents produced by its research department showing 
that the economy is in a good or bad state. 
Note 11. See Tirole (1992) for a first discussion of the origins of these transaction costs. 
Note 12. Gabillon and Martimort (2004) assume that K(.) is strictly concave and increasing in the interval (0, k/r). 
These two assumptions capture the fact that transferring more wealth to the CB makes it easier for the interest 
group to affect his decision-making but the marginal efficiency of doing so decreases. 
Note 13. The difference in inflation targets under political control is:  with . The 
difference in inflation targets under political independence is:  and 
 
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Note 14. A similar approach is considered by Alesina (1988), Balke (1988) and Ellis (1991). 
Note 15. This depends on differences in the ideologies if voters are rightist or leftist. 
Note 16. Even in the case of monetary policy offered when the central banker benefits from political 
independence, the SW function is the same; only the agency cost AC changes. 
Note 17. In effect, an optimal monetary policy proposed by principal i must implement collusion-proofness at 
minimal agency cost:  s.t. a collusion-proofness constraint and participation 
constraint. For the first constraint, the Central Banker must be sufficiently rewarded to report truthfully, so that 
colluding with the anti-inflationist interest group becomes a dominated strategy. The grand-contract must thus 
satisfy a collusion-proofness constraint: . The left-hand side represents the wage differential 
necessary to prevent collusive behaviour and to induce a truthful announcement by the Central Banker. The 
right-hand side represents the benefits that the Central Banker can obtain from his collusive relationship with the 
anti-inflationist interest group. For the second constraint, the Central Banker prefers to enter the public sector 
rather than obtain a utility equal to zero, so that the participation constraint must be satisfied: . Note that 
when , the two constraints imply also . This last participation constraint can be omitted 
in what follows as long as the stake for collusion remains positive. For further details on collusion-proofness 
constraint and participation constraint see Gabillon and Martimort (2004, p. 364). 
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Note 18. See note 13 to compare this results with those by Gabillon-Martimort. 
Note 19. Gabillon and Martimort, in order to prevent collusion between interest groups and central bankers, 
consider an ex ante collusion-proofness constraint:  
 
The left-hand side above represents the wages expected to prevent collusive behaviour; the right-hand side 
represents the bribe that the anti-inflation group is willing to pay to the Central Banker to make him lie in his 
announcement of the economic shock. The Central Banker strictly prefers to commit to a side-contract before 
political uncertainty resolves rather than wait for the outcome of the election. Indeed, because the efficiency of 
side-contracting K(.) is a strictly concave function of the collusive stake: 
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The optimal monetary policy proposed by principal i must implement collusion-proofness at minimal agency 
cost:  
 
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,
  s.t. a collusion-proofness constraint and participation constraint. The 
participation constraints are identical to the case of political dependence , from which it follows that 
. For every detail on this point see Gabillon and Martimort, (2004, p.,368). 
Note 20. See Persson and Tabellini (2000; 2003). 
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